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Nieves v. Bartlett
Ruling Below: Nieves v. Bartlett, 712 Fed.Appx. 613 (9th Cir. 2017)
Overview: Bartlett sued under § 1983 claiming that the officers who arrested him for disorderly
conduct and harassment had no probable cause for arrest. The arrest occurred at a party where the
police officers, Nieves and Weight, interpreted Bartlett’s body language as “hostile” resulting in
his arrest and placement in the "drunk tank." Bartlett was charged with disorderly conduct and
resisting arrest.
Issue: Whether probable cause defeats a First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
RUSSELL P. BARTLETT, Plaintiff- Appellant
v.
LUIS A. NIEVES, in his personal capacity and BRYCE L. WEIGHT, in his personal
capacity, Defendants-Appellees
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Decided on October 20, 2017
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
Before WARDLAW, CLIFTON,
OWENS, Circuit Judges.

and

Plaintiff-Appellant Russell P. Bartlett
appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Alaska state trooper DefendantsAppellees Luis A. Nieves and Bryce L.
Weight on his § 1983 claims of false arrest,
excessive force, malicious prosecution, and
retaliatory arrest. We review the district
court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
Garcia v. Cty. of Merced, 639 F.3d 1206,
1208 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm in part and
reverse in part.
1. We affirm the district court’s grant
of summary judgment to the defendants on

plaintiff’s false arrest claim on the ground of
qualified immunity. A two-part test applies to
qualified immunity claims. Construing the
facts in the light most favorable to the party
alleging injury, the court must evaluate: 1)
whether the officer violated a constitutional
right; and 2) whether that right was clearly
established at the time of the officer’s
actions. See Lal v. California, 746 F.3d 112,
116 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)).
Adopting Bartlett’s version of the
facts, we agree with the district court that
defendants had at least arguable probable
cause to arrest Bartlett for harassment,
disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, or assault
20

under Alaska law. When Sergeant Nieves
initiated Bartlett’s arrest, he knew that
Bartlett had been drinking, and he observed
Bartlett speaking in a loud voice and standing
close to Trooper Weight. He also saw
Trooper Weight push Bartlett back. Although
Bartlett may have his own explanations for
his actions, these explanations were not
known to Sergeant Nieves; the test is whether
“the information the officer had at the time of
making the arrest” gave rise to probable
cause. John v. City of El Monte, 515 F.3d 936,
940 (9th Cir. 2008). We agree with the
district court that it did; a reasonable officer
in Sergeant Nieves’s position could have
concluded that Bartlett stood close to Trooper
Weight and spoke loudly in order to
“challenge” him, provoking Trooper Weight
to push him back. See Alaska Stat. §
11.61.120(a)(1). Therefore, we affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to
the troopers on Bartlett’s false arrest claim.
2. We affirm the district court’s grant
of summary judgment to the troopers on
Bartlett’s excessive force claim on the
ground of qualified immunity. In particular,
Bartlett has failed to point to a case that
clearly establishes that the troopers’ limited
use of force to effect his arrest was
unconstitutional. Bartlett’s references to
Young v. County of Los Angeles, 655 F.3d
1156 (9th Cir. 2011), and Blankenhorn v.
City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 2007),
are unavailing. In the present case, the
troopers reacted quickly to a fluid situation
and were faced with the undisputedly
challenging circumstances of Arctic Man.
These circumstances were not present in
Young and Blankenhorn. Because the second

prong of the qualified immunity test requires
“a case where an officer acting under similar
circumstances . . . was held to have violated
the Fourth Amendment,” and we are not
aware of any such case, we agree with the
district court that the officers are entitled to
qualified immunity on Bartlett’s excessive
force claim. See White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct.
548, 552 (2017) (instructing that clearly
established law must be “particularized” to
the facts of the case).
3. We also affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on Bartlett’s
malicious prosecution claim. To prevail on
his malicious prosecution claim, Bartlett
must show that the troopers prosecuted him:
1) with malice; 2) without probable cause;
and 3) for the purpose of denying him a
specific constitutional right. Freeman v. City
of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir.
1995). Because we conclude that the officers
had probable cause to arrest Bartlett, we
affirm the grant of summary judgment to the
troopers on this claim.
4. We reverse the district court’s
dismissal of Bartlett’s retaliatory arrest
claim. The district court dismissed this claim
on the ground that the troopers had probable
cause to arrest Bartlett. However, we have
previously held that a plaintiff can prevail on
a retaliatory arrest claim even if the officers
had probable cause to arrest. See Ford v. City
of Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188, 1195–96 (9th Cir.
2013) “[A]n individual has a right to be free
from retaliatory police action, even if
probable cause existed for that action.”).
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The Supreme Court’s decision in
Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658 (2012),
does not foreclose this result. In Reichle, the
Court noted that it had not previously
recognized a First Amendment right to be
free from a retaliatory arrest supported by
probable cause, but did not conclude that a
plaintiff must show lack of probable cause to
make a retaliatory arrest claim. Id. at 664–65.
Indeed, the Court emphasized that the rule
that it announced in Hartman v. Moore, 547
U.S. 250 (2006), which held that a plaintiff
cannot make a retaliatory prosecution claim
if the charges were supported by probable
cause, does not necessarily extend to
retaliatory arrests. Reichle, 566 U.S. at 666–
70.
We have since clarified that in the
Ninth Circuit, a plaintiff can make a
retaliatory arrest claim even if the arresting
officers had probable cause. When the
troopers arrested Bartlett at Arctic Man in
2014, it was clearly established that “an
individual has a right to be free from
retaliatory police action, even if probable
cause existed for that action.” Ford, 706 F.3d
at 1195–96. Therefore, the district court erred
in concluding that Bartlett’s retaliatory arrest
claim fails simply because the troopers had
probable cause to arrest him.
Bartlett has potentially established a
claim of retaliatory arrest in violation of the
First Amendment because 1) he has
“demonstrate[d] that the officers’ conduct
would chill a person of ordinary firmness
from future First Amendment activity” and 2)

the evidence that he has advanced would
enable him “ultimately to prove that the
officers’ desire to chill his speech was a butfor cause of their allegedly unlawful
conduct.” Id. at 1193.
Regarding the first prong of the test,
we have held that an arrest in retaliation for
the exercise of free speech is sufficient to
chill speech. Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693
F.3d 896, 917 (9th Cir. 2012). Regarding the
second prong, we have held that, once a
plaintiff has provided “sufficient evidence for
a jury to find that the officers’ retaliatory
motive was a but-for cause of their action,”
“the issue of causation ultimately should be
determined by a trier of fact.” Ford, 706 F.3d
at 1194. Construing the facts in the light most
favorable to Bartlett, he has advanced
sufficient evidence to meet this standard.
Most importantly, Bartlett alleged that
Sergeant Nieves said “bet you wish you
would have talked to me now” after his arrest.
This statement, if true, could enable a
reasonable jury to find that Sergeant Nieves
arrested Bartlett in retaliation for his refusal
to answer Sergeant Nieves’s questions earlier
in the evening. We therefore conclude that
the district court erred in granting summary
judgment for the troopers on Bartlett’s
retaliatory arrest claim.
Each party to bear its own costs.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN
PART, AND REMANDED.
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“Supreme Court Trying Again on the First Amendment Retaliatory Arrest
Question: The question that the Court didn't resolve in Lozman v. Riviera-Beach is
back, in another case on which the Supreme Court just granted”
Reason
Eugene Volokh

June 28, 2018
This past Term's Lozman v. RivieraBeach was expected to resolve a hugely
important question: Can someone sue for
retaliatory arrest if he there was probable
cause to arrest him for some fairly petty
crime, but there's lots of reason to think that
he wouldn't have been arrested if it weren't
for his past constitutionally protected speech?
The Court resolved the case on very narrow
grounds, limited to the rare cases where
plaintiff can show a municipal policy of
going after him because of his speech. But the
Court just agreed to hear a new case, Nieves
v. Bartlett, that involves the broader issue; the
Court will presumably decide the question
this coming year. Here are the facts of the
case as described in the state's petition for
certiorari:
Every spring, thousands of extreme skiers,
snowmobilers, and spectators gather in the
remote Hoodoo Mountains of interior Alaska
for Arctic Man, a multi-day festival centered
around a high-speed ski and snowmobile
race. Campers congregate at night to drink
and party, and rampant alcohol use
compounds safety concerns at the event.
On the last day of Arctic Man in 2014,
Troopers Luis Nieves and Bryce Weight

were on duty, patrolling a large outdoor party
where minors appeared to be drinking
alcohol. Nieves encountered respondent
Russell Bartlett at the party and attempted to
speak with him, but Bartlett declined to talk
to Nieves. Meanwhile, Trooper Weight
spotted a minor who appeared to be drinking
alcohol and began speaking to him at the edge
of the crowd. Bartlett marched up to Weight,
loudly demanding that Weight stop talking to
the minor.
The district court, reviewing video footage of
the incident, found that "Trooper Weight, Mr.
Bartlett, and the minor [were] standing very
close together exchanging words" and that
"Bartlett's right hand was at roughly shoulder
height within inches of Trooper Weight's
face." The 5′9″, 240-pound Bartlett, who at
the time of the incident was too intoxicated to
drive, later maintained that his close
proximity to Trooper Weight and loud voice
were appropriate given the volume of music
at the party, but Trooper Weight viewed
Bartlett's "escalating voice, his look of anger,
[and] his body language" as "hostile" "preassault indicators." To create a safe space for
himself, Trooper Weight placed his open
palms on Bartlett's chest and pushed him
back.
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Trooper Nieves, believing that Bartlett posed
a danger to Weight, ran to help. Following a
struggle, the troopers were able to subdue and
arrest Bartlett.
He was released without injury after a few
hours in the "drunk tank." Bartlett was
charged with disorderly conduct and resisting
arrest. The prosecution later dismissed the
case for budgetary reasons, but the assigned
prosecutor stated to the district court that he
believed probable cause existed to charge
Bartlett for disorderly conduct, resisting
arrest, and assault.
Bartlett sued Troopers Weight and Nieves,
asserting [among other things] false arrest
and imprisonment ... [and] retaliatory arrest
.... On the false arrest and imprisonment
claims, the [district] court ruled there was
probable cause to arrest Bartlett for
harassment, so the officers were entitled to
summary judgment. The court ruled that the
existence of probable cause also barred
respondent's First Amendment retaliatoryarrest claim, noting that this Court "has never

recognized a First Amendment right to be
free from a retaliatory arrest that is supported
by probable cause." ...
The Ninth Circuit affirmed on all claims
except for retaliatory arrest. The appellate
court ruled that the troopers had probable
cause to arrest Bartlett for assault, disorderly
conduct, harassment, and resisting arrest.
Nevertheless, the court reiterated its earlier
holding in Ford v. City of Yakima, 706 F.3d
1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2013), that the existence
of probable cause for an arrest does not bar a
plaintiff's claim that the arrest was retaliatory
in violation of the First Amendment. Pointing
to respondent's allegation (uncorroborated by
other witness testimony, audio or video
recording) that Trooper Nieves said after the
arrest, "Bet you wish you would have talked
to me now," the court ruled that a jury might
be persuaded that Bartlett was arrested for his
earlier refusal to assist with the investigation,
rather than for his harassing and belligerent
conduct. The court thus reversed the grant of
summary judgment on the retaliatory-arrest
claim and remanded for trial....
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“Supreme Court allows retaliatory arrest lawsuit to move forward”
The Washington Post
Robert Barnes

June 18, 2018
The Supreme Court on Monday gave a civic
activist in Florida another shot at proving that
his arrest at a city council meeting was in
retaliation for his criticism of public officials.
The court said it was ruling narrowly for Fane
Lozman, whose battles with the Riviera
Beach City Council are legendary. It said a
lower court had been wrong to stop his
retaliation lawsuit.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for the
court, said a citizen’s ability to criticize
government without fear of retribution ranks
“high in the hierarchy of First Amendment
values.”
But he wrote what even he described as a
narrow ruling, sending the case back to a
lower court and saying that Lozman will have
to prove “the existence and enforcement of an
official policy motivated by retaliation” on
the part of the city council members.

warranted, and it said this ruling did not
affect that.
Lozman in an interview called the ruling a
“really big day for citizen-activists” and said
it makes clear that municipalities are not
immune to the law. He said he would be
willing to settle the case in exchange for an
apology from the city council — now very
different from the one he initially sued — and
reimbursement for legal fees.
Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach grew from
an attempt to cut off Lozman at a city council
meeting into a major free-speech showdown.
During the public comments at a meeting in
November 2006, Lozman was talking, as he
often did, about political corruption. The
presiding council member told him to stop,
and he refused.

The vote was 8 to 1, with Justice Clarence
Thomas dissenting.

“Carry him out,” Elizabeth Wade told a
police officer. Lozman was led away in
handcuffs and spent hours in jail. The
episode can be seen on YouTube. The court’s
opinion included the link.

The court was particularly concerned about
opening up individual police officers to
lawsuits
for
making
“split-second
judgments” about whether an arrest is

Lozman was charged with disorderly conduct
and resisting arrest without violence. A state
prosecutor declined to pursue the charges,
however, saying a conviction was unlikely.
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Lozman filed a civil rights lawsuit against the
city, saying the council violated his First
Amendment rights with a retaliatory arrest. A
recording of a private meeting council
members attended months earlier showed
that they had agreed to teach Lozman a
lesson.

jury agreed. Lozman’s complaint could not
go forward.
The Supreme Court years ago decided that a
finding of probable cause barred a claim of
retaliatory prosecution. So the question
before the court was whether the same
standard should be applied to arrests.

But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th
Circuit, which covers Florida, Georgia and
Alabama, said that if the government can
demonstrate a reasonable belief that any law
was broken — probable cause — the
retaliation claim cannot go forward.

This was Lozman’s second trip to the
Supreme Court, a rarity when the cases
present different questions of law.

With disorderly conduct and resisting arrest
out, prosecutors found an obscure Florida law
that makes it a misdemeanor to interrupt or
disturb “any school or any assembly of
people met for the worship of God or for any
lawful purpose.”
It is possible that is what Lozman was about
to do, the appeals court judge reasoned, and a

The first time he and the city met at the high
court, the justices reviewed his claim that
Riviera Beach had improperly used federal
admiralty law to seize (and later destroy) his
two-story plywood houseboat, with French
doors, moored at the city marina. The court
ruled 7 to 2 against the city, saying that
Lozman’s houseboat was more house than
boat and that admiralty law did not apply.
Both cases were Lozman v. Riviera Beach.
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“South Florida Activist is 2-0 at the Supreme Court after First Amendment
victory”
Miami Herald
Alex Daugherty

June 18, 2018
A South Florida man just won a First
Amendment victory at the Supreme Court in
a case that could protect disgruntled citizens
from arrest for voicing their displeasure at
elected officials during public meetings.
The nation's highest court ruled in favor of
political gadfly Fane Lozman on Monday in
a 8-1 decision, the culmination of more than
a decade of work for Lozman after he was
dragged out of a Riviera Beach city council
meeting and arrested after speaking about the
allegedly corrupt dealings of a Palm Beach
County commissioner.

The court's decision on Monday affects
citizens who show up to public meetings to
vent and question the actions of elected
officials. If one official orders the arrest of
someone speaking at a public meeting and the
rest of the elected body doesn't object, the
person arrested can now have a cause of
action against the municipality if he or she
can prove animosity.
That means it's harder for angry elected
officials to use their power to arrest people
they simply don't like.

Lozman is now 2-0 at the Supreme Court, an
accomplishment that his lawyer said is
unprecedented for an individual plaintiff in a
court that rejects around 7,000 cases every
year and hears only 80. He also won a
maritime law case related to his floating
home in 2013.

"It's just been an amazing effort to try to crack
the overbreadth of government power
towards citizens who want to exercise their
First Amendment rights," Lozman said in an
interview on Monday. "This arrest happened
in 2006 and the case was filed in February
2008, so we've been fighting this case for
over 10 years. It's been a Herculean effort."

"As far as I know he's the only person who's
done it in recent times," said Pamela Karlan,
an attorney from Stanford Law School who
argued Lozman's case in front of the court.
"There were people who got the same case
twice to the Supreme Court, but not two
different cases."

This isn't Lozman's first time in front of the
Supreme Court. The semi-retired South
Florida stock trader-turned First Amendment
crusader also won a Supreme Court case in
2012, when justices ruled 7-2 that Lozman's
floating home was not a "vessel" and
therefore not subject to the federal maritime
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jurisdiction that eventually led local officials
to seize and destroy it.
Lozman was already victorious in his fight
against Riviera Beach that led to his arrest in
the first place. He saved other people's homes
from being taken via eminent domain for a
new private marina in Riviera Beach, and he
was able to keep the public marina out of
private hands.
"I won the case today but I won what I really
wanted years ago, which was the marina,"
Lozman said. "They didn't take the marina
and the scum that tried to do that are out of
power. We finally got the last one of those
kicked out last month."
But while his fellow citizens were able to
keep their boats and homes on the marina,
Lozman became consumed with his First
Amendment fight for people like him who are
thrown out of public meetings for needling
elected officials.
"I've heard horror stories from all over the
country, people call me and they say they
were physically thrown out of meetings. If
you go on YouTube there’s lots of people
being dragged out by elected officials and I
wanted to stop that," Lozman said, adding
that he worked between 8,000 and 9,000
hours on his two Supreme Court cases.
Karlan said it was Lozman's idea to pursue
the First Amendment case as a potential
Supreme Court pick. He approached the
Stanford lawyers with his plan after doing the
research on his own.
"For years and years and years I'd work on
these cases from 11 p.m. to 3 a.m., five days

a week," Lozman said. "I taught myself the
law. I think that this is almost like a kind of
hobby, every night I kind of built the
groundwork to have this case go to the next
step. It became like building a boat, building
this case."
The ruling in Lozman's favor was narrow in
the sense that it applied to elected boards and
municipalities who boot speakers from their
meetings. There were also questions within
the lawsuit about people arrested by police
during events like protests who are not
engaged in the act itself, such as journalists
and bystanders. Those questions weren't part
of the Supreme Court's decision.
"Basically, they made a distinction between
individual police officers and the decision of
the municipality," Lozman said. "We didn't
have the facts (to make a broader First
Amendment challenge). They gave it to us
but they didn’t give it to the media. I'm
looking for a member of the media to move
this issue forward."
Lozman said the ruling was a "dream come
true" and that he was happy to win by a larger
margin on Monday than in 2012. Clarence
Thomas was the only justice to rule against
Lozman.
"I’m thrilled, I'm glad [Justice Anthony]
Kennedy voted for me this time," Lozman
said. "Last time he dissented and I'm glad he
came around."
Lozman said he will continue to advocate on
First Amendment issues and is still fighting
in the courts on who will pay for about
$230,000 in legal fees.
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But today was the culmination of 12 years of
hard work.

Supreme Court to make things right,"
Lozman said.

"I just think my dream came true. I knew
what happened to me was wrong and I never
thought I’d have to go all the way to the

"I helped move the bar forward on the First
Amendment."
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“Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach and First Amendment Retaliatory Arrest
Damages Claims: The Court Again Sidesteps the Probable Cause Issue”

Nahmod Law Blog

Sheldon Nahmod

July 19, 2018
In Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S.
Ct. — (2018), the Supreme Court once again
avoided ruling generally on the question
whether a section 1983 plaintiff who alleges
a retaliatory arrest in violation of the First
Amendment must allege and prove the
absence of probable cause in addition to
impermissible First Amendment motive. Or,
to put it another way, whether probable cause
to arrest is a defense to a First Amendment
retaliatory arrest damages claim. Instead, it
ruled narrowly for the plaintiff based on the
particular facts of his case.
In Lozman, the plaintiff alleged that a city
(through its policymakers) had him arrested
in retaliation for the exercise of his First
Amendment rights. He claimed that he was
arrested at a city council meeting when he got
up to speak because he previously had
criticized the city’s eminent domain
redevelopment efforts and had also sued the
city for violating the state’s Sunshine Act. He
was never prosecuted. However, the plaintiff
conceded that there was probable cause for
his arrest for violating a Florida statute
prohibiting interruptions or disturbances at
certain public assemblies, because he had

refused to leave the podium after receiving a
lawful order to do so.
Ordinarily, such a plaintiff, in order to make
out
a
section
1983
First
Amendment retaliatory arrest claim, would
only have to allege and prove that this
impermissible retaliatory motive caused him
harm, and the defendant would have the
burden of disproving the absence of but-for
causation in order to escape liability. Mt.
Healthy Bd. of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274 (1977). But here the city argued that even
if its motive was impermissible under the
First Amendment, there was probable cause–
an objective Fourth Amendment standard–to
arrest the plaintiff anyway, and that this
constituted a defense to the plaintiff’s First
Amendment retaliation claim.
In Lozman, the Eleventh Circuit had ruled
that probable cause was indeed a defense to a
section 1983 First Amendment retaliatory
arrest claim. Specifically, it determined that a
section 1983 retaliatory arrest plaintiff must
allege and prove not only the retaliatory
motive but the absence of probable cause as
well. In other words, the absence of probable
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cause was an element of the section 1983
plaintiff’s retaliatory arrest claim.
The
Eleventh
Circuit’s
on Hartman v. Moore

Reliance

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision was based on
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hartman v.
Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), which held that
for
section
1983 retaliatory
prosecution claims against law enforcement
officers (prosecutors themselves are
absolutely immune from damages liability
for their decision to prosecute), the plaintiff
must allege and prove not only the
impermissible motive but the absence of
probable cause as well. The Court reasoned
that there was a presumption of prosecutorial
regularity that the section 1983 plaintiff must
overcome as an element of his retaliatory
prosecution case. Accordingly, as a matter of
section 1983 statutory interpretation and
policy (but not of constitutional law), the
plaintiff should have this twin burden in
retaliatory prosecution cases.
The Court in Hartman explained that
a retaliatory prosecution case was very
different from the usual First Amendment
retaliation case that involved a relatively
clear causal connection between the
defendant’s impermissible motivation and
the resulting injury to the plaintiff. It was
appropriate in such cases to apply the Mt.
Healthy burden-shift rule under which the
defendant has the burden of disproving butfor causation in order to prevail.
As discussed in a prior post, the Court
previously had a similar First Amendment

retaliatory arrest issue before it in Reichle v.
Howards, 566 U.S. 658 (2012). But it
avoided addressing the merits by ruling for
the individual defendants on qualified
immunity grounds.
In my view, as I have argued previously, the
Court’s decision in Hartman should not be
applied to First Amendment retaliatory arrest
cases.
The
express
reason
for
the Hartman rule is that First Amendment
retaliatory prosecution cases involve a
presumption of prosecutorial regularity. But
this reason is clearly inapplicable where there
is no prosecution and the constitutional
challenge is to the arrest itself.
Moreover, First Amendment retaliatory
arrest claims involve the impermissible
motivation (a subjective inquiry) of law
enforcement officers irrespective of probable
cause, which is an objective (could
have arrested) inquiry. Under this objective
inquiry, the existence of probable cause
precludes a Fourth Amendment violation
based on an arrest even where that arrest is
grounded on an offense different from the
offense for which probable cause is deemed
to be present. This provides a great deal of
protection for police officers who allegedly
make arrests in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
However, if a police officer arrests a person
for racial reasons, and the claimed injury is
grounded on those racial reasons, it should
not matter for the Equal Protection claim–even if it would for a Fourth Amendment
claim–-that the officer had probable cause to
do so, namely, that the officer could
31

have arrested the plaintiff. This reasoning
should apply as well to §1983 First
Amendment retaliatory arrest claims.
It was always questionable whether the Court
in Hartman should have allowed policy
considerations to change the usual section
1983 causation rules in First Amendment
retaliatory prosecution cases. Regardless,
that reasoning should most definitely not be
extended to First Amendment retaliatory
arrest cases. Such policy considerations as
are
discussed
in Hartman are
most
appropriately addressed, if they are to be
addressed at all, as part of the qualified
immunity inquiry, not the elements of the
section 1983 retaliatory arrest claim.
The Supreme Court’s Narrow Decision
in Lozman
In any event, in Lozman, the Court, in an
opinion by Justice Kennedy, reversed the
Eleventh Circuit and ruled that in this
particular case the plaintiff did not have to
allege and prove the absence of probable
cause, and probable cause was not a defense
to his First Amendment retaliatory arrest
claim.
Emphasizing the narrowness of its decision,
the Court pointed out that the plaintiff only
challenged the lawfulness of his arrest under
the First Amendment; he did not make an
equal protection claim. Further, he conceded
there was probable cause for his arrest,
namely, that he could have been arrested for
violating the Florida statute. Thus, the only
question was whether the existence of

probable cause barred his First Amendment
retaliation claim in this case.
The Court went on to observe that the issue
in First Amendment retaliatory arrest cases
was
whether Mt.
Healthy or Hartman applied. It addressed
what it considered to be the strong policy
arguments on both sides of the issue. The
Court then determined that resolution of the
matter would have to wait for another case:
“For Lozman’s claim is far afield from the
typical retaliatory arrest claims, and the
difficulties that might arise if Mt. Healthy is
applied to the same mine run of arrests made
by police officers are not present here.” For
one thing, the plaintiff did not sue the officer
who made the arrest. For another, since he
sued the city, he had to allege and prove an
official policy or custom, which “separates
Lozman’s claim from the typical retaliatory
arrest claim.” Moreover, the causation issues
here were relatively straightforward because
the plaintiff’s allegations of an official policy
or custom of retaliation were unrelated to the
criminal offense for which the arrest was
made but rather to prior, protected speech. In
short, the causal connection between the
alleged animus and the injury would not be
“weakened by [an official’s] legitimate
consideration of speech.”(quoting Reichle,
566 U.S. at 668).
This did not mean that the Lozman plaintiff
would necessarily win on remand. A jury
might find that the city did not have a
retaliatory motive. Or, under Mt. Healthy, the
city might show that it would have had the
plaintiff arrested anyway regardless of any
retaliatory motive.
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Justice Thomas was the sole dissenter. He
maintained that the Court had simply made
up a narrow rule to fit this case. Instead, he
argued that plaintiffs in First Amendment
retaliatory arrest cases have the burden of
pleading and proving the absence of probable
cause. That is, probable cause “necessarily
defeats First Amendment retaliatory-arrest
claims.” Accordingly, the plaintiff should
lose here.
Comments
The better approach, as indicated above, is to
apply Mt. Healthy in all retaliatory arrest
cases. Hartman should be limited to
retaliatory prosecution cases. Nevertheless,
after Lozman the question is still open in the

Supreme Court. This means, among other
things, the retaliatory arrest individual
defendants will continue to have a powerful
qualified immunity argument, namely, that
the law is not clearly settled even now,
per Reichle v. Howards.
Note, however, that the Court may yet
resolve this question in its forthcoming 2018
Term. On June 28, 2018, it granted certiorari
in Nieves v. Bartlett, 712 Fed.Appx. 613 (9th
Cir. 2017)(No.17-1174), to address once
again whether probable cause is a defense to
a section 1983 First Amendment retaliatory
arrest claim. In this unreported decision, the
Ninth Circuit ruled that probable cause
is not a defense to First Amendment
retaliatory arrest damages claims.
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“Fane Lozman Goes to the Supreme Court, Again”
The New Yorker
Jeffrey Toobin

March 2, 2018
It’s mostly a myth that scrappy outsiders
often find a way to take their cases “all the
way to the Supreme Court.” Government, big
business, and criminal matters dominate the
Justices’ docket. On the other hand, there is
Fane Lozman, a man often referred to as a
civic gadfly, from Riviera Beach, Florida.
He’s managed to get a case before the
Supreme Court—two of them, actually.
Lozman’s legal odyssey began when he set
up an unusual housekeeping arrangement, in
2002. A former marine and financial trader
who is now fifty-six years old, Lozman built
a floating home, sixty feet long by twelve feet
wide. “The home consisted of a house-like
plywood structure with French doors on three
sides,” a Supreme Court opinion later
described it. “It contained a sitting room,
bedroom, closet, bathroom, and kitchen,
along with a stairway leading to a second
level with office space. An empty bilge space
underneath the main floor kept it afloat.”
Lozman had his residence towed to various
marinas in Florida, until he settled, in 2006,
in Riviera Beach, which is in tony Palm
Beach County. At the time, the city was
hoping to redevelop its marina, and Lozman
didn’t want to relocate. A nasty fight ensued,
and the city ultimately took possession of the
home and later destroyed it.

The original dispute turned on a fairly
obscure point of admiralty law: whether
Lozman’s home fit the definition of a
“vessel”—specifically, whether it was
“capable of being used . . . as a means of
transportation on water.” Lozman had
originally represented himself in the dispute,
but he recruited lawyers and students at
Stanford Law School’s Supreme Court clinic
to take on his case, and they ultimately won
it, 7–2, in 2013. According to Justice Stephen
Breyer’s opinion, “Nothing about Lozman’s
home suggests that it was designed to any
practical degree to transport persons or things
over water.” It had no ability to propel itself,
and its French doors were not watertight. So,
in the convoluted way of the case, because
Lozman’s home was not a vessel, the city
couldn’t seize it, and he wound up staying
where he was.
While Lozman’s first case was working its
way through the courts, his battles with the
Riviera Beach City Council continued. The
Council still wanted to develop the marina
area, and planned to take it by eminent
domain. But the Florida legislature had
passed a law banning the use of eminent
domain where the property was to be used by
a private developer—as was the plan in
Riviera Beach. So the Council called a
surprise meeting and approved the plan on
the day before the new law went into effect.
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Lozman sued, arguing that the public didn’t
receive sufficient advance notice of the
meeting. The city ultimately dropped its
redevelopment plan, but not its efforts to boot
Lozman from his boat.
In the midst of these struggles, on November
15, 2006, the City Council held a meeting that
included, as was customary, a period for open
comment, when citizens could address the
Council on issues of their choice for three
minutes apiece. Lozman began speaking
about municipal corruption, and, within a few
seconds, a Council member told a police
officer to “carry him out.” While a video
camera rolled, Lozman was then arrested,
handcuffed, and taken to a holding cell at the
local police station. He was later released,
and no charges were filed, but Lozman sued
the city for violation of his First Amendment
rights. It was this case that wound up before
the Supreme Court on Tuesday morning.
Lozman had an unusual problem before the
Justices: his case was too good. Every Justice
who spoke seemed to acknowledge that
Lozman’s rights had been violated. As Chief
Justice John Roberts put it, “I found the video
pretty chilling. I mean, the fellow is up there
for about fifteen seconds, and the next thing
he knows he’s being led off in handcuffs,
speaking in a very calm voice the whole time.
Now, the Council may not have liked what he
was talking about, but that doesn’t mean they

get to cuff him and lead him out.” Still,
several Justices worried that the egregious
facts of Lozman’s case might lead them to
create a standard that would subject many
communities to similar lawsuits. They
needed to figure out how to create a standard
that would not discourage law enforcement
from keeping order in public meetings, while
preventing the kind of abuse that Lozman
suffered. “I’m very concerned about police
officers in difficult situations,” Justice
Anthony Kennedy told Pamela Karlan, a
Stanford Law professor who was
representing Lozman. “In this case, there’s a
very serious contention that people in elected
office deliberately wanted to intimidate this
person, and it seems to me that maybe in this
case we should cordon off or box off what
happened here from the ordinary conduct of
police officers.”
After the arguments, the outcome of the case
seemed in doubt, but Lozman was serene as
he held court on the marble steps of the
Supreme Court building. (He’s a veteran of
such moments, after all.) Standing a regal six
feet four inches, and wearing a well-cut black
suit, Lozman said that he was looking
forward to returning to Florida. “I just want
to enjoy the fruits of my labor,” he said. But
there was one more business venture on his
mind. “I’m planning on building a
modernistic stilt-home community on the
water,” he said. Who could object to that?
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“Argument preview: Justices to consider whether probable cause defeats claims of
retaliatory arrest for First-Amendment-protected expression”
SCOTUS Blog
Heidi Kitrosser

February 21, 2018
On November 15, 2006, Fane Lozman rose to
speak during the public-comments portion of
a regular public meeting of the City Council
of Riviera Beach, Florida. What followed
was anything but a run-of-the-mill discussion
about the intricacies of local government. To
the contrary, when Lozman began to talk
about “corrupt local politician[s],” he was cut
off by a councilperson and asked to cease that
line of commentary. When Lozman refused
to comply, he was arrested, handcuffed and
removed from the meeting.

11th Circuit. The 11th Circuit acknowledged
Lozman’s “compelling” argument that the
district court had given erroneous jury
instructions on retaliatory animus. The court
of appeals held, however, that any such error
was harmless, because the jury had found that
the arresting officer had probable cause to
arrest Lozman. The court relied on an earlier
11th Circuit case, Dahl v. Holley, which held
that a plaintiff cannot prevail on a First
Amendment retaliatory arrest claim if there
was probable cause to justify the arrest.

In February 2008, Lozman filed a Section
1983 suit against Riviera Beach in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of
Florida. He alleged, among other things, that
his arrest constituted retaliation for FirstAmendment–protected activity. Specifically,
Lozman charged that his arrest amounted to
payback for two categories of protected
expression: his then-pending lawsuit against
the city under Florida’s Sunshine Act, and his
extensive public criticisms of city officials
and policies, including and preceding his
remarks on November 15.

On Tuesday, February 27, the Supreme Court
will consider whether the 11th Circuit was
correct in holding that the presence of
probable cause necessarily defeats a claim of
retaliatory arrest for First-Amendmentprotected expression. In 2006, in Hartman v.
Moore, the Supreme Court held that probable
cause bars First Amendment claims alleging
retaliatory prosecution. The court has yet to
determine, however, whether to extend
the Hartman rule (the “probable-cause bar”)
to the retaliatory-arrest setting. Although the
2012 case Reichle v. Howards presented that
very question, the court resolved Reichle on
the narrower grounds of qualified immunity.
Currently, the federal courts of appeals are
split on the issue.

After a jury returned a verdict for the city,
Lozman sought a new trial, which the district
court denied, and he filed an unsuccessful
appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
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In urging the Supreme Court not to extend the
probable-cause bar to retaliatory-arrest
claims, Lozman argues that there are key
distinctions between the prosecution and
arrest settings. In this vein, he
characterizes Hartman as having “rest[ed]
entirely on the fact that prosecutors … are
absolutely immune from suit.” Given this
immunity, a retaliatory-prosecution claim
necessarily entails a representation that a
non-prosecuting official induced a prosecutor
to conduct a prosecution for retaliatory
reasons. To prevail in such a case, when there
is probable cause to support the grounds
officially given for prosecution, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the official grounds
are distinct from the prosecutor’s subjective,
retaliatory motives. Such a showing
necessarily entails a complicated causal
chain. More importantly, the process of
identifying and litigating over that chain
undermines the prosecutorial independence
and
corollary
“‘presumption
of
[prosecutorial] regularity’” that immunity is
meant to protect. In contrast, Lozman
maintains, the causal chain is relatively
“straightforward” in the retaliatory-arrest
setting. Additionally, he posits that “no
potentially responsible actor” in that setting
is beyond scrutiny.
Lozman also argues that a probable-cause bar
poses far greater risks to First Amendment
interests in the retaliatory-arrest context than
in the retaliatory-prosecution context. In the
prosecution setting, “the putative plaintiff
will have an indictment or charging
instrument that cabins the probable cause
inquiry by identifying a specific crime.” Yet
“in retaliation cases involving arrests, the

‘subjective reason for making the arrest need
not,’” under Devenpeck v. Alford, “‘be the
criminal offense as to which the known facts
provide probable cause.’” A probable-cause
bar in the arrest setting thus immunizes state
actors who cause arrests to be made in
retaliation for protected speech, so long as
they can show that there was probable cause
to arrest the speaker for jaywalking,
speeding, disturbing the peace or committing
any criminal violation at all.
To illustrate the potential for abuse, Lozman
points to the facts of his own case. Shortly
after his arrest, Lozman was given a “notice
to appear” that listed two charges:
“disorderly conduct” and “resisting arrest
without violence.” Both charges were soon
dismissed by the state’s attorney, who found
“no reasonable likelihood” that they could be
prosecuted with success. At the trial in
Lozman’s Section 1983 suit, the question
resurfaced as to whether there had been
probable cause to arrest him for a crime. The
trial court judge concluded that no probable
cause had existed to arrest him for either
charging offense. The city then “identified
two new candidates” for provisions that
Lozman might have violated: a prohibition
on “‘trespass after warning’” and a law
against
“‘willfully
interrupt[ing]
or
disturb[ing] any school or any assembly of
people met for the worship of God or for any
lawful purpose.’” After initially leaning
toward the trespass provision, the district
court settled on the willful-disturbance law as
the one “at play here.” Ultimately, the latter
offense was the only one “as to which the jury
was asked to assess probable cause.”
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For its part, the city denies that there are
meaningful, material distinctions between the
retaliatory-arrest and retaliatory-prosecution
settings. It maintains that each type of claim
presents the same fundamental causality
problem:
“[S]omething
other
than
[retaliatory] animus – the prosecutor’s
independent decision to prosecute, or the
officer’s decision to arrest for reasons
unrelated to animus toward the arrestee’s
speech – may have led to the supposed
retaliatory action.” Nor do retaliatory arrests
threaten free-speech interests any more than
do retaliatory prosecutions. If anything, the
opposite is true, because a “criminal
prosecution is a far greater intrusion on a
defendant’s liberty than an arrest.” The city
also dismisses the notion that the arrest
setting is comparatively rife with the
potential for government abuse of the
probable-cause bar. “Rarely,” the city notes,
“is an officer who harbors some ill will
towards a speaker present at the exact
moment the speaker does something that
gives probable cause for an arrest.” And in
any event, “arrests backed by probable cause
pose little danger to the freedom of speech.”
Far greater threats are posed by “arrests
unsupported by probable cause.”
The city also stresses the practical value of
the probable-cause bar in the retaliatoryarrest setting. The city observes that “officers
must often consider protected speech when
deciding whether to make an arrest.” For
example, speech might “provide ‘evidence of
a crime.’” Or it might influence an officer’s
assessment of whether a suspect threatens
public safety. With a probable-cause bar in

place, officers can “make arrests in such
circumstances without fear of having to later
litigate whether their real motivation was
preventing [crime] or punishing speech.” To
illustrate this point, the city highlights the
example of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
9th Circuit, which does not impose a
probable-cause bar. The city summarizes a
number of retaliatory-arrest cases that went
to trial in the 9th Circuit, and suggests that
they lacked merit.
Among the questions to watch for from the
justices are those designed to tease out the
practical dangers each party’s position might
pose. For example, the city might be asked to
grapple with scenarios in which government
officers intentionally and openly retaliate
against protestors for their protected speech
by targeting those people for aggressive
enforcement of laws against minor
transgressions,
such
as
jaywalking.
Lozman’s attorney might be pushed, on the
other hand, to consider the limits of a
complainant’s ability to state a claim for
retaliatory arrest based on speech that is
protected but that may show violent impulses
on the speaker’s part. It will be interesting as
well to see to what extent, if at all, the
justices’ questions reflect recent events, such
as the demonstrations and violence in
Charlottesville, Virginia, protests against
President Donald Trump’s administration,
and protests by Black Lives Matter. And of
course, we can count on old First
Amendment chestnuts like the chilling effect
and the heightened value of “core” political
speech to crop up throughout the discussion.
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“Supreme Court Could Continue First Amendment Charge”
Bloomberg Law
Kimberly Robinson

August 8, 2018
The U.S. Supreme Court has seemingly taken
it easy on free speech cases after last term’s
First Amendment bonanza.
OT 2017—as last term is known by court
watchers—had five cases that touched on
free speech, all of which were high-profile.
The most explosive was Janus v. AFSCME,
in which Justice Elena Kagan accused the 54 majority of “weaponizing the First
Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges,
now and in the future, to intervene in
economic and regulatory policy.”
She warned of a future in which “black-robed
rulers” would override citizens’ choices.
Decisions like Janus “invite conservative
legal activists to keep pushing far-reaching
First Amendment claims,” David Gans, of
the progressive Constitution Accountability
Center, Washington, told Bloomberg Law.
“There are not any cases involving such
claims on the Court’s docket for next Term
so far,” Gans said.
But there are some waiting in the wings.
And in “the years to come, we are likely to
see a new suite of First Amendment claims in
the context of unions and labor law,

disclosure, and campaign finance,” Gans
said.
Next Term
Nearly 10 percent of the court’s docket last
term touched on the First Amendment, but so
far next term has only one. And the issue is
strikingly similar to one the court heard last
term, Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach.
At issue in Nieves v. Bartlett is whether
probable cause defeats a First Amendment
retaliatory claim. That’s nearly identical to
the question presented in Lozman.
But the court stressed in Lozman that the
inquiry was very fact specific. So Nieves
doesn’t seem like it will break a lot of new
First Amendment ground.
There are, however, other hot-button speech
cases waiting to be granted by the justices.
Those include:


Cosby v. Dickinson, a defamation
case against actor Bill Cosby related
to rape allegations;



Keister v. Bell, about permitting
requirements for campus speech; and



Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist.,
asking what kind of free speech rights
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teachers and coaches have while
around students. The speech at issue
in Kennedy involves
a
coach’s
prayers—in
the
presence
of
students—before high school football
games.
Compulsory Bar Membership
None of those free speech cases, however,
would have the implications threatened by
Kagan: slicing down popular legislation via a
robust reading of the First Amendment.
But two cases pending before the court have
that potential.
Fleck v. Wetch is a challenge to North
Dakota’s mandatory bar association
requirement for attorneys. Similar to the
argument
in Janus,
the
petitioner
there says that he can’t be compelled to
subsidize speech he disagrees with.
The Supreme Court previously held that
compulsory bar membership could be
squared with the First Amendment if the
“expenditures are necessarily reasonably
incurred for the purpose of regulating the
legal profession or improving the quality of
legal services.”
The petitioner argues that the First
Amendment landscape has shifted and that
the court’s previous ruling should be
overruled.
Net Neutrality
The Supreme Court also has before it a series
of
cases regarding
the
Federal
Communication Commission’s now-defunct
net neutrality rules.

Under the Obama administration, the FCC
issued an order requiring internet service
providers to treat all information the same
regardless of the source.
The D.C. Circuit rejected a challenge to that
order in 2016.
In refusing to reconsider that decision in
front of the full D.C. Circuit back in 2017, the
court rejected the suggestion that the First
Amendment barred such regulation of
internet service providers. Judge Brett
Kavanaugh, who President Donald Trump
has nominated to the Supreme Court,
dissented from the decision not to rehear the
case, saying that the First Amendment “bars
the Government from restricting the editorial
discretion of Internet service providers.”
A finding in line with Kavanaugh’s view
would arm internet service providers “with a
First Amendment shield against net neutrality
obligations,” Judge Sri Srinivasan said.
Several parties petitioned the Supreme Court
for review in 2017. But the cases have stalled
in the high court, likely due to political
developments.
The FCC under the Trump repealed the net
neutrality rules in late 2017, and the repeal
went into effect in June.
The federal government Aug. 2 asked the
high court to vacate the lower court’s ruling
as a result.
In May, however, the Senate voted 52-47
to overturn the FCC’s repeal in a resolution
under the Congressional Review Act. The
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resolution is waiting on action in the U.S.
House of Representatives.

the House, all eyes would turn to the Supreme
Court.

Should net neutrality supporters succeed in
their uphill battle to get the CRA passed in
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